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Abstract 
The intellectual figure of Herbert A. Simon is well known for having introduced the influential 
notion of bounded rationality in economics. Less known, at least from the economists‟ point of 
view, is the figure of Simon as eminent cognitive psychologist, co-founder of so-called 
cognitivism, a mainstream approach in cognitive psychology until the 80s of the last century. In 
fact, the two faces of Simon‟s intellectual figure, as rationality scholar and as cognitive scientist, 
are not factorizable at all: according to Simon himself, cognitivism is bounded rationality and 
bounded rationality is cognitivism. This paper tries to answer a simple research question: has the 
notion of bounded rationality fully followed the development of cognitive psychology beyond 
cognitivism in the post-Simonian era? If not, why? To answer such questions, this paper focuses 
on a very specific historical episode. In 1993, on the pages of the journal Cognitive Science, 
Simon (with his colleague Alonso Vera) openly confronted the proponents of a new 
(paradigmatic) view of cognition called situated cognition, a firm challenger of cognitivism, 
which was going to inspire cognitive psychology from then on. This paper claims that this tough 
confrontation, typical of a paradigm shift, might have prevented rationality studies in economics 
from coming fully in touch with the new paradigm in cognitive psychology. A reconstruction of 
the differences between cognitivism and situated cognition as they emerged in the confrontation 
is seen here as fundamental in order to assess and explore this hypothesis. 
 
JEL codes: B31; B41; D03; D80 
Keywords: Herbert A. Simon, bounded rationality; situated cognition theory; economics and 
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“Obvious responses to opportunities and circumstances […] 
 have put me on the particular roads I have followed” 
Herbert A. Simon, Models of my life, pp. xvii-xviii 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the era of interdisciplinary science, paradigm changes in one discipline are assumed to 
have significant systemic impacts on other disciplines. This should be a fortiori true for fields of 
inquiry that are programmatically at the intersection between two disciplines, as is the case with 
economic psychology
2
. When a paradigm change in either economics or psychology occurs, the 
change is expected to have a foundational impact on the other discipline. This essay starts by 
considering that research in cognitive psychology
3
 has undergone a true paradigm shift in the last 
25 years, conveyed through the labels of situated, distributed and embodied cognition. It then 
inquires whether and in which way this paradigm shift has influenced the field of economic 
psychology. The result of this inquiry – which is worth anticipating – will be that no significant 
and programmatic influence has yet taken place. In particular, this essay focuses on the field of  
rationality studies, which has traditionally been most conducive to cross-disciplinary fertilization, 
yet, as we shall see, the current situation is still characterized by the „missing‟ influence of the 
paradigm shift as far as the notion of economic  rationality is concerned. 
                                                          
2
 The term ‘economic psychology’ is used here for it expresses better than others the idea of the (at least virtual) 
interconnections between economics and psychology. Of course, what economic psychology is and what its many 
historical and theoretical instantiations are is the very crucial point that also this paper tries to address. 
3
 According to the American Psychological Association (APA), cognitive psychology concerns “the study of higher 
mental processes such as attention, language use, memory, perception, problem solving, and thinking” (see the 
Glossary of Psychological Terms at http://www.apa.org/research/action/glossary.aspx). 
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The choice of rationality as the privileged field in which to assess the implications of a 
paradigm change in cognitive psychology is mainly related to the intellectual contribution of 
Herbert A. Simon. Simon is particularly important in this story, since the path-breaking notion of 
bounded rationality is an outcome of Simon‟s „twofold‟ intellectual activity as both an economist 
and a cognitive scientist
4
. Although this has already been historiographically acknowledged (e.g. 
Sent 1997, 2004; Fiori, 2005, 2011), economic psychologists, economists and rationality scholars 
tend to overlook the role of Simon as a leading cognitive scientist, and pioneer and founding 
father of that specific approach to cognitive science labeled cognitivism 
5
. This omission has 
important consequences, even for those who today claim to have superseded Simon‟s approach to 
bounded rationality: not being fully aware of bounded rationality‟s cognitivist foundations – and, 
in addition, not being fully aware of possible alternative foundations, as these have presented in 
history –  leads these foundations to be retained even when one would not wish to do so.  
The approach of this paper is mainly historical. It singles out a highly significant 
historical episode, when Simon, as spokesman of the cognitivist paradigm in cognitive 
psychology, (jointly with his Carnegie Mellon colleague Alonso Vera) openly confronted the  
leading proponents of the newly born critical approach of situated cognition (also called situated 
action theory, hereafter SA). It was 1993 when the journal Cognitive Science hosted Vera and 
Simon‟s target article, with the objective of facilitating communication between the two sides of 
a confrontation that argued respectively for and against a paradigm shift in cognitive psychology. 
Looking carefully at that confrontation, one becomes aware of the fact that what was at stake was 
not only the future of cognitive psychology, but also that of rationality studies, this being in 
                                                          
4
 In what follows, the expressions cognitive psychologist and cognitive scientist will be used interchangeably, even 
if of course not all cognitive scientists are cognitive psychologists.  
5
 For an account of Simon’s cognitivism as a product of historical embeddedness see Sent (2001) and, obviously, 
Simon (1991). 
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particular due to the always-underlying twofold role of Simon as both cognitive psychologist and 
rationality scholar. Reconstructing that debate from the rationality studies point of view will be 
helpful in at least four ways. First, supported by Simon‟s explicit stance, we shall be able to 
establish the foundational link that exists between cognitive psychology and the notion(s) of 
rationality. Second, awareness of this link is important to the extent that it implies that a 
paradigm change in cognitive psychology should have some impact on the notion(s) of 
rationality. Through a reconstruction of the points of difference between Simon and the 
proponents of SA we shall be able to identify the issues at stake in the confrontation, and thus to 
better figure out which direction a revision of the notion of bounded rationality should possibly 
take. Third, we shall be able to identify this historical episode as a crucial fork in the subsequent 
development of rationality studies. In fact, the thesis of this essay is that the episode represented a 
watershed that has blocked the claims of situated and embodied cognition to be internalized in 
rationality studies until now. Last but not least, this paper aims to do justice to the intellectual 
figure of Simon. Some scholars have blamed Simon for his opposition to SA, using expressions 
such as „Simon‟s paradox‟ (Patokorpi, 2008) or „Simon‟s error‟ (Secchi, 2010). Although those 
judgments could be partially right in substance, we think that it is not fair to blame Simon for not 
having readily accepted a new point of view on cognition that in 1993 was an emergent but 
highly fragmented thread in cognitive psychology. As we will see, a paradigm change was at 
stake, and paradigm changes by definition involve incommensurability issues (Kuhn, 1962) that 
are beyond one‟s control. Nevertheless, as we will notice, some of Simon‟s claims have today re-
gained momentum even in the new paradigm.   
The essay will be structured as follows. Section 2 provides a cursory review of the 
different interpretations of the notion of bounded rationality. Since the story we are going to tell 
concerns a specific controversy over the interpretation of bounded rationality, this review will 
5 
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provide us with the necessary background. Section 3 is devoted to theoretically and historically 
introducing the new paradigm in cognitive psychology known under the label of SA. In 
particular, this section emphasizes how SA was the first step towards a more radical paradigm 
shift in cognitive psychology that was then known under the label „distributed‟ cognition, and 
today finally is known as „embodied‟ cognition (in fact we will speak of a SDE paradigm shift). 
Section 4 reconstructs the 1993 Cognitive Science debate in depth, emphasizing the theoretical 
points of distance between Simon and the SA proponents. Particular emphasis will be put on the 
paradigm shift symptoms of the debate, i.e. the fact that the two sides of the controversy were 
using the same words but with very different meanings. Section 5 comes back to rationality, 
reviewing the post-Simonian theories of bounded rationality and assessing them in the light of 
their „missing‟ SDE cognition hints.   
 
2. Bounded rationality: variations on a theme 
 
As Klaes and Sent (2005) have definitively shown, the conceptual history of the notion of 
„bounded rationality‟ is a history of pluralism. As often happens in intellectual history, a 
conceptual nucleus, roughly encompassing some basics of the notion of bounded rationality, has 
floated over rationality studies, from the pre-Simonian to the post-Simonian era, but it has never 
reached a completely stable meaning. The role of this section is to provide some criteria with 
which to review the historical variations on the theme of „bounded rationality‟. 
As a matter of fact, one of the major reasons why the notion of bounded rationality has 
generated ambiguities is due to Simon himself, who was not always consistent in his use of the 
notion. We can, in fact, identify two versions of bounded rationality given by Simon himself: a 
wider (Simon1) version and a narrower (Simon2) version. The first version, Simon1, can also be 
6 
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called the “scissors” version. It was explicitly introduced in 1972, jointly with Allen Newell, in 
their famous book Human Problem Solving, although it had already been implicitly expressed at 
least since Simon (1956). It reads, 
 
“[j]ust as a scissors cannot cut paper without two blades, a theory of thinking and problem solving cannot predict 
behavior unless it encompasses both an analysis of the structure of task environments and an analysis of the limits of 
rational adaptation to task requirements” (Newell and Simon, 1972, p. 55).  
 
The scissors hypothesis is a complementarity hypothesis: on the one hand there is the 
structure of an environment, on the other hand the subject whose cognition has adapted to this 
environment. In the course of his career, in particular when Simon interacted with professional 
economists, he supported an amended version of this view, which we can call Simon2. Simon2 
consists in the simple hypothesis that individuals are limited information processors, i.e. that they 
are limited in knowledge and computational capacity (see e.g. Simon, 1987b; Simon et al, 1992, 
p. 1). In this sense, Simon2 may be read as a narrow version of Simon1, focusing only on one 
blade of the scissors (i.e. the cognition of individuals, and thus neglecting the structure of the 
environment). However, this last version is what has percolated into economics (see, e.g., Sent, 
1998). Commenting on this state of affairs from a broad epistemological point of view, Callebaut 
(2007) calls Simon‟s a “silent revolution”, in the sense that the real revolutionary nucleus of 
Simon1 – i.e. the complementarity between cognitive abilities and tasks – has been mostly 
„silenced‟ into an amended version of the rational choice framework (Simon2) (see e.g. 
Rubinstein, 1998 and Simon‟s related complaints as expressed in Chapter 11 therein).  
The dichotomy Simon1–Simon2 still characterizes current research in rationality studies in 
economics. Simon‟s heritage can in fact be reconstructed following either the heirs who have 
7 
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followed Simon1 or those following Simon2. On the one hand, Kahneman and Tversky‟s 
heuristics and biases approach (e.g. Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982) – the Simonians2 – 
considers heuristics and cognitive limitations on the same footing as systematic „imperfections‟ 
in human cognition, leading to those imperfections being equated with the outcome of 
„irrationality‟ of people‟s judgment6. On the other hand, Gigerenzer‟s ecological rationality 
research program (see, e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 1999) – the Simonians1 – emphasizes the 
„complementarist‟ and also „evolutive‟ view of cognition and environment. Heuristics, which in 
Kahneman‟s framework are the sources of errors and irrationality, are, from Gigerenzer‟s point of 
view, the outcome of adaptation between cognition and environment. If heuristics are often a 
source of errors – as they undoubtedly are – this is only because those heuristics are used in 
contexts that are not their original evolutionary ones (e.g. Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002). If, on the 
contrary, they are used in their original evolutionary contexts, they succeed better than „rational 
choice‟ procedures: this is the rationale behind the homo heuristicus point of view (Gigerenzer 
and Brighton, 2009)
7
.  
The notion of bounded rationality can be factorized into more minute conceptual 
components, each one subject to variation, which would then constitute the ingredients of 
different historical specifications of bounded rationality. Katsikopoulos (2014), for instance, tries 
to accomplish such a conceptual decomposition, identifying the crucial variables of bounded 
rationality into i) the reliance on either normative axioms or empirical facts in modeling; ii) the 
assumption of either optimization or satisficing as bounded rationality‟s objective; iii) the 
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 The consistency of Kahneman and Tversky’s thought with Simon’s framework has sometimes been put into 
question, simply because Simon himself did not look at himself as a true Simon2 theorist. Nonetheless, as 
Kahneman and Tversky themselves clearly remark, their results  “are consistent with the conception of bounded 
rationality originally presented by Herbert Simon” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986, pp. S272-S273). 
7
 Fiori (2011) also takes into consideration also the reconceptualizations of the notion of bounded rationality as 
developed by James March (1978) and Nelson and Winter (1982). Davis (2010) identifies another strand of Simon’s 
tradition in Litchtenstein and Slovic’s (2006) program of endogenizing preferences. We will not consider these 
further variations in this essay extensively. However, some important remarks are presented in note 18. 
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practice of fixing parameters or letting them vary freely; iv) the reliance (or not) on psychological 
theories. This last point is particularly important, since allow us to reconstruct bounded 
rationality along its disciplinary belonging. The general characterization of bounded rationality as 
a research domain in „economic psychology‟ is not in fact able to exhaust the actual bounded 
rationality‟s disciplinary instantiations. Ross (2014), for instance – following a tradition in 
economics that can be called the „anti-psychological‟ tradition (see Giocoli, 2003, Chapter 2) – 
disputes that psychology constitutes the ultimate foundations of the notion of bounded rationality. 
In this vein, he distinguishes between a „psychological‟ notion and an „economic‟ notion of 
bounded rationality: while the former is an attempt to give an account of the features of human 
judgment in general, the latter is allowed to consider a more restricted version of „bounded‟ 
human judgment, given the presence in the economic domain of institutional factors that restrict 
and constrain „general‟ human judgment8.  
The issue of the irreducibility of „economic‟ to „psychological‟ bounded rationality points 
to another direction in which the notion of bounded rationality can be plural, i.e. its relationship 
with cognitive science in general, and cognitive psychology in particular. This issue can be said 
to take the question of whether psychology has to be the ultimate foundation of bounded 
rationality to an higher level: if psychology does not provide the foundations of bounded 
rationality, this could also be true for cognitive psychology
9
. Simon‟s point of view on this issue 
was clear: he claimed forcefully that bounded rationality should be constitutively rooted in 
psychology and cognitive psychology
10
 (see, e.g., Simon, 1959; Simon, 1976a; Simon, 1978). It 
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 Such disciplinary distinctions may also be at the basis of the different experimental practice implemented in 
economics and psychology in order to study ‘bounded rationality’ (Hertwing and Ortmann, 2001). 
9
 This does not hold, of course, for cognitive science. As we have already remarked, cognitive psychology is a 
branch of cognitive science. The latter can also be interested in ‘not-strictly-psychological’ factors, such as 
neurobiological aspects of cognition.  
10
 As far as we know, Simon never really distinguished cognitive science from cognitive psychology. 
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is the main starting point of this essay that Simon‟s version of bounded rationality is indissolubly 
linked with his „cognitivist‟ psychology stance. From a general point of view, identifying a 
connection between cognitive psychology and bounded rationality would open the space for a (at 
least virtual) possibility that the plurality of views of bounded rationality can parallel the plurality 
of views on cognitive psychology. The following sections will be devoted to identifying both the 
virtual space of such plural connections and the actual processes that brought bounded rationality 
to be linked to just one specific thread of cognitive psychology, not by chance the one that had 
Simon among its founding fathers.  
 
 
3. The situated, distributed and embodied (SDE) turn in cognitive psychology: 1985- 
 
This section is devoted to shedding light on the paradigm shift that has occurred since the 
mid-1980s in cognitive psychology in the form of the so-called situated, distributed and 
embodied cognition (SDE) turn. In particular, the section will emphasize that Simon was one of 
the founding fathers of „cognitivism‟, the perspective in cognitive psychology and artificial 
intelligence (AI) that the SDE shift has put decisively and maybe irreparably into question.  
The „cognitivist‟ paradigm in cognitive psychology is a product of the 1950s, born as a 
paradigm shift, in its turn, with respect to „behaviourist‟ cognitive psychology (see Gardner, 
1985). One of the conceptual pillars of cognitivism was erected by Simon himself and Allen 
Newell (Newell and Simon, 1976) in the notion of the physical symbol system hypothesis 
(PSSH). PSSH consists in the idea that human intelligence (i.e. judgment, reasoning, etc.) is or 
can be traced back (reduced) to symbolic information processing. This hypothesis was to become 
foundational for both cognitive psychology and AI research, to the point that these two 
10 
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disciplinary fields, thanks to the PSSH, arrived at coinciding in what was to be known as the 
view of „the human mind as a computer‟. There should not be any ontological difference between 
the human mind and an artificially constructed mind, to the extent that the former could be 
replicated just by replicating a suitable „software program‟ that mimics the internal states of a 
subject. The convergence of AI and cognitive psychology is directly founded on the idea that AI 
can shed decisive light on human cognition itself (Winston, 1984). 
This is because the validity of the PSSH was first challenged in the field of AI: if PSSH 
was, as Newell and Simon claimed, “the necessary and sufficient condition for intelligence” 
(Newell and Simon, 1976, p. 116), robots showing undisputable signs of intelligence should be 
built uniquely by relying on this assumption. It is at this crucial point that the cognitivist 
assumptions and the PSSH began to creak. The first step of departure from the cognitivist 
assumptions is identifiable in the 1980s „connectionist‟ models of AI, which against symbolic 
and sequential computing opposed parallel and adaptive computing (e.g. neural networks, cellular 
automata, etc.). A further step of departure came in the late 1980s, when Rodney Brooks at the 
MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory built robot prototypes that showed 
signs of intelligence without relying on any fundamental ingredients of the cognitivist framework 
(e.g. centralized system information processing, centralized representation of the external 
environment). The basic functioning of Brooks‟ robots was a „distributed‟ and „reactive-
behavioral‟ conception of intelligence, an expression of a new point of view called the physical 
grounding hypothesis (Brooks, 1991). In fact, the behavior of Brooks‟ robots emerged from a 
continuous interaction of a minimalist programming with the resources of the environment
11
. 
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 ‘Herbert’ was the name of one of Brooks’ robots (note the ironic reference to Simon’s first name) (see Brooks, 
1990). Its task was to collect soda cans in a laboratory environment, and it accomplished this task in an apparently 
intelligent way. Nonetheless, its principle of functioning was not representationist or symbolic: Herbert did not rely 
11 
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This was a direct challenge to the PSSH‟s claim to provide the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for intelligence. Brooks showed that the cognitivist assumptions were excessive 
requirements for his robots.  
The attack on cognitivism and the PSSH was, however, not confined to AI, but it had its 
counterparts in the field of human psychology and the study of human behavior as well. A crucial 
notion which the early debate focused around was, for instance, the notion of a plan of action. 
What was a plan of action and which were the cognitive requirements for successful action? 
According to the cognitivist assumptions, a plan of action consisted in a set of pre-specified rules 
of behavior implemented on a detailed description (representation) of the environment in which 
action takes place. The ethnographer of technology Lucy Suchman (1987), from the Xeros Palo 
Alto Research Center, contrasted this account of a plan of action with an „interactionist‟ picture. 
Her favorite counterexample was the way users approach new technological objects: how, she 
asks, does a subject learn to use a new technology? Does the subject implement a plan based on 
the instruction kit or approach the machine just by interacting with it? Trying to answer such 
questions, a vast anthropological inquiry took place in different and disparate environments, in 
order to establish that interactionism is the real way in which cognition works (Winograd and 
Flores, 1986; Lave, 1988, Hutchins, 1995). 
Another notion that underwent a reconceptualization was the notion of action itself. In the 
cognitivist framework, action was conceived as a pragmatic activity to be performed after 
reasoning, oriented to accomplishing whatever goal. The SA and distributed framework found a 
non-pragmatic foundation for action under the notion of „epistemic action‟: action is not only 
„pragmatic‟ but it is also „epistemic‟, in the sense of being able to elicit information from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
on any map of the laboratory and nor did it chart courses for picking up the cans. It was simply provided with a 
sensor to detect can-like shapes, along with a locomotion system relying on impact-preventing sensors. 
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environment that would be otherwise unattainable (Kirsh and Maglio, 1994). Thus, also the 
cognitive psychologists of the American Pragmatism tradition were contributing to defeat 
cognitivism (Johnson and Rohrer, 2007). 
In this cognitive psychology revolution, some put more emphasis on the „situated‟ aspects 
of the critique of cognitivism (e.g. Clancey, 1997) and others on the „distributed‟ aspects (e.g. 
Clark, 1997). Nonetheless, all these sets of arguments, although coming from different 
perspectives and emphasizing different aspects, led in the same direction of making cognitivism 
collapse. In 1985 cognitivism had already been labeled, at least in the field of artificial 
intelligence, „Good-Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence‟ (GOFAI) (see, e.g., Haugeland, 1985). 
However, the „situated‟ and „distributed‟ aspects of  SDE did not exhaust the scope and extent of 
the revolution. They historically constituted a sort of preparatory ground for the advent of the so-
called embodied revolution of the 2000s (Wilson, 2002). The core position of embodied cognition 
is that cognition cannot be detached from a physical substratum that is evolutionarily connected 
with it. One of the main claims of this position is that high-level cognitive activities (reasoning, 
judgment, etc.) share the same neural patterns as low-level cognitive activities (looking, walking, 
breathing, etc.) being both based on the human sensory-motor system (Gomila and Calvo, 2008), 
and this sharing status of mutual influence cannot be recreated without a bodily dimension. 
 
4. Reconstructing the debate 
 
This essay identifies a precise historical event as crucial in the relationship between 
bounded rationality and cognitive psychology. In 1993, in the middle of a rising wave of works 
that proposed or embraced a new view of cognition, the journal Cognitive Science hosted a 
debate in a special issue entitled „Situated Action‟ between two spokesmen for cognitivism, 
13 
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Simon and Alonso Vera, and a group of leading scholars of the emerging SA
12
, the cognitive 
scientists James Greeno and Joyce Moore, Lucy Suchman, Philip Agre and William Clancey (see 
Norman, 1993). In what follows, we outline a reconstruction of that debate in order to identify 
the points of controversy between the two positions, and in order to comparatively assess in 
Section 4 whether post-Simonian rationality studies have really tackled them or not.  
 
4.1. Vera and Simon‟s defense: the „equivalence‟ thesis of cognitivism 
The attitude and scope of Vera and Simon‟s contribution was never perceptibly 
conflictive or hostile, neither blindly defensive. Instead, it rather devoted itself to diminishing and 
subtly disarm the claims of SA theorists who were asking for a sharp dismissal of the cognitivist 
paradigm. Vera and Simon‟s thesis was that, in principle, the PSSH was able to overcome all the 
difficulties singled out by SA, by reabsorbing them. To achieve this objective, they first of all 
divided the field of their opponents into a „hard form‟ SA and a „soft form‟ SA. According to 
Vera and Simon‟s reconstruction, the former were those who claimed that “[cognitive 
psychologists] must focus on how people [behave] instead of how people think or what 
computers can do. They [SA, however] do not explain to proponents of the symbolic approaches 
why the former is antithetical to the latter” (Vera and Simon, 1993, p. 11); the latter, instead, 
simply claimed that cognitivism should “incorporate the SA principles of representing objects 
functionally and interacting with the environment in a direct and unmediated way” (ibid.).  
The crucial and controversial point was whether and to what extent the notion of 
„situation‟ and the new conceptual framework of „situatedness‟ could be properly characterized 
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 In fact, the debate featured proponents of both the distributed and the situated turns, but their arguments are 
most of the time too similar for a clear-cut line of demarcation to be drawn. In this section, when we speak of “SA” 
we mean both the ‘situated’ and ‘distributed’ cognition points of view. 
14 
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and tackled by a symbolic approach. As the SA theorists claimed, referring to the authority of the 
philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
 
“[t]o acquire an awareness of a situation is, however, always a task of particular difficulty. The very idea of a 
situation means that we are not standing outside it and hence are unable to have any objective knowledge of it. We 
are always within the situation and to throw light on it is a task that is never entirely completed. (ibid., p. 12, as 
quoted in Winograd & Flores, 1986, p. 29) 
 
This idiosyncraticist definition of situation can be translated, according to Vera and 
Simon, into an operationalist one. The notion of situation could be rendered, in full accordance 
with SA (Winograd and Flores, 1986), by claiming that situations (which in the language of 
decision-making theorists are also called „ill-structured environments‟) are characterized by 
„breakdowns‟, i.e. phases in the interaction between a subject and the environment in which the 
course of action is broken by the subject‟s inability to characterize the salient traits of the 
environment. By accepting this operational definition of situation, Vera and Simon claim that the 
characterization is compatible with a representationalist, centralized and symbolic processing 
approach; it just needs some „interactionist‟ addendum, such as „belief revision‟ processing, etc.  
This would not put, however, into question the cognitivist assumptions. 
Another part of Vera and Simon‟s argument concerns the broader role of symbolic 
representations in cognition. According to them, „objective‟ representations of the environment 
are always a necessary condition of intelligence. Even „minimalist‟ symbolic representations are 
a necessary condition for an entity to show some intelligent behavior (ibid., p. 20). As they claim, 
even Brooks‟ minimalist robots incorporate some form of symbolic representation, in the bits 
constituting their software programs. To take another example, Vera and Simon also argue that 
15 
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human learning is an eminent symbolic process (a point that SA theorists will contend, see 
Section 4.6 below), since storing and retrieving memory are essential ingredients of it.  
At a more formal level, the issue of the comparability between cognitivism and SA is 
tackled by comparing the formal strategies of resolution of the game Tower of Hanoi, often used 
as a testbed in experimental inquiries into cognition and rationality. Vera and Simon compare a 
„goal-recursive strategy‟ – the one commonly employed by PSSH devices – with a „perceptual 
strategy‟ in which the resolution of the task is accomplished without relying on either internal 
representations or elaborate goal planning. As Vera and Simon show (ibid., pp. 30-31), there is a 
formal equivalence in the ways the two strategies perform the task. Following this line of 
argument, they claim that in the end a „generalized perceptual framework‟ can be devised which 
employs a minimalist symbolic system
13
.   
According to Vera and Simon, this controversy in cognitive science is not only linked 
with, but actually directly collapses into, the framework of bounded rationality. As Vera and 
Simon openly claim:  
 
“we think a defensible claim, to replace the invalid one of hard SA, is that behavior can only be understood in the 
context of environments that change continually, and whose complexity is so great that only extremely simplified 
approximations of them can be handled by the systems's response mechanisms or its planning mechanisms, severally 
or jointly. Bounded rationality is the name of the game, and it is as surely present in a game of chess as in any of the 
games that humans play in what they call "the real world".” (ibid, p. 45, emphasis added) 
 
Bounded rationality, from this point of view, is the principle of intelligence of robots 
attempting to imitate human intelligence. In the cognitivist framework, it means that it is the 
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 Cognitivism had always put decisive emphasis on the objective of unifying and generalizing the other theories of 
cognition. It never conceived itself as a theory of cognition among others. This was, in a sense, its distinctive 
trademark (see, e.g., Newell, 1990).   
16 
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principle of intelligence of humans as well. The outcome of Vera and Simon‟s feeble negotiation 
results thus in the concession of providing artificial agents with minimalist rules of behavior (and 
so, consequentially, to conceive of humans as holding just minimalist rules of behavior, i.e. 
heuristics), that should nonetheless rely on the PSSH
14
. 
In what follows, we will take into consideration the responses provided by the SA 
theorists. We will see that the common aim informing their responses was to make clear that a 
paradigm shift was at stake. It was not just a problem of designing effective robots, but one of 
understanding the way human cognition works in a different manner, and thus of identifying the 
best research framework to give an account of it. 
 
4.2. Suchman: plans and „situational‟ complexity  
Lucy Suchman‟s reply concerns a series of issues related to her research on plans of 
actions (see Suchman, 1987). In particular, she focuses – as is often the case in the exchanges in 
this special issue – on conceptual clarifications. According to Suchman, Vera and Simon‟s notion 
of plan simply results in cognitivism + SA addenda, i.e. pre-specified courses of action (plans) 
that rely on SA (interactionist) addenda when „breakdowns‟ occur. This notion of „enriched‟ 
planning, however, depends on the conceptual separateness between plans and SA, something 
that Suchman totally rejects: a plan is „situated action‟ and cannot be conceptually separated from 
it (p. 75). Moreover, Suchman provides a significant restatement of Vera and Simon‟s definition 
of „hard form‟ SA. Where Vera and Simon stated that “the central claim of hard SA [is] that 
behavior can only be understood in the context of complex real-world situations” (Vera and 
Simon, 1993, p. 45), she claims that the definition should be more properly rephrased as: 
                                                          
14
 The link between bounded rationality and cognitivism has been asserted repeatedly by Simon. One becomes 
aware of this even by skimming cursorily over his collected papers (Simon, 1981; Simon, 1983; Simon 1979-1989; 
Simon, Egidi, Marris, and Viale, 1992). 
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“behavior can only be understood in its relations with real-world situations” (Suchman, 1993, p. 
74, emphasis in the original). Suchman employs two changes in this definition: i) the expression 
„in the context of‟ is replaced with „in its relations with‟, emphasizing that contexts are not pre-
specifiable, but emerge from interactions; ii) the word „complex‟ is also dropped, since “the 
complexity or simplicity of situations is a distinction that inheres not in situations but in our 
characterization of them; that is, all situations are complex under some views, simple under 
others” (ibid. p. 75). 
 
4.3 Greeno and Moore: symbols and the necessary and sufficient conditions of intelligence 
The reply by the cognitive scientists Greeno and Moore focuses on the role of symbols 
and of symbolic representations in cognition. They clearly identify the main point of difference 
with respect to Vera and Simon‟s position: 
 
“[t]he question […] seems to be something like this: whether 1) to treat cognition that involves symbols as a special 
case of cognitive activity, with the assumption that situativity is fundamental in all cognitive activity, or 2) to treat 
situated activity as a special case of cognitive activity, with the assumption that symbolic processing is fundamental 
in all cognitive activity. We advocate the first option; Vera and Simon advocate the second” (Greeno and Moore, 
1993, p. 50) 
 
Cognitivism denies the existence of behavior that is not mediated by some form of 
symbolic process, while on the other hand SA denies the omnipresence of symbolic 
representation. In particular, Greeno and Moore emphasize the importance of non-symbolic 
processing in cognition. According to their definition, there is non-symbolic processing when 
signs that are used and implemented in a software program are not semanticized and referential to 
the external world: in other words, not all signs or code strings are symbols (p. 54). An example 
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of non-symbolic processing in human cognition is the Gibsonian notion of „affordances‟ (Gibson, 
1977), where objects in the external world induce actions without a need for a semantic 
processing of these objects (e.g. the handles on a cup provide an affordance for holding). In the 
end, the pattern of arguments that rejects the omnipresence of symbolic manipulation leads 
Greeno and Moore to claim that, contrary to Newell and Simon‟s PSSH, “the question should not 
be whether a system that uses symbolic processes is sufficient, but whether the symbolic 
processes that are hypothesized are necessary” (p. 56).  
 
4.4. Agre: the boundaries of cognition 
The reply by Philip Agre also tackles the socio-theoretical aspects of the controversy 
cognitivism Vs SA, by addressing the „symbolic approach‟ as a scientific „worldview‟, with its 
own heuristics and metaphors in dealing with cognition. According to Agre, what  
 
“actually characterizes the cognitivist worldview is not the notion of a symbol but rather a certain system of 
metaphors. These metaphors begin by marking out a firm distinction in kind between the mental Inside and the world 
Outside. The "encoding" and "decoding" processes mediate between these on a causal level, and relations of 
"designation" hold between them on a semantic level. Knowledge on this view generally winds up looking like a 
copy of the world inside the head, a "world model." What's really striking throughout this literature is the tendency to 
confuse this world model with the reality it is supposed to represent.”  (Agre, 1993, p. 66) 
 
It is the necessity of setting the debate in terms of the Inside/Outside metaphor that makes 
communication between SA and cognitivism difficult, since it is this very distinction that SA 
rejects. As Agre claims, “[m]y point is that the metaphor system of Inside and Outside finds itself 
unable to make any stable sense of concepts that reside neither in the agent nor in the world, but 
in the relationship and interaction between the two” (ibid., p. 67). The strictures imposed by the 
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Inside/Outside distinction misrepresent the SA worldview, leading SA to be called „behaviorist‟ 
just because it does not accept „internalist representationalism‟ (ibid., p. 64). 
 
4.5 Clancey: the neurobiological underpinning of SA 
William Clancey addresses the target article at length, proposing arguments against Vera 
and Simon‟s cognitivism from a neurobiological viewpoint. Clancey‟s diagnosis of the 
shortcomings of cognitivism relies on the acknowledgment that “the symbolic approach conflates 
„first-person‟ representations in our environment (e.g., utterances and drawings) with „third-
person‟ representations (e.g., mappings a neurobiologist finds between sensory surfaces and 
neural structures” (Clancey, 1993, pp. 87-88). This conflation, according to Clancey, is wrong, 
since it relies on the unwarranted “basic assumption […] that perception and reasoning are 
possible without acting” (ibid, p. 94). However, 
 
“the neural structures and processes that coordinate perception and action are created during activity [...] That is, 
the physical components of the brain, at the level of neuronal groups of hundreds and thousands of neurons, are 
always new – not predetermined and causally interacting in the sense of most machines we know – but coming into 
being during the activity itself, through a process of reactivation, competitive selection, and composition” (ibid.).  
 
This perspective leads to a shift from the notion of context to that one of situation in 
cognitive psychology (Rohlfing, Rehm and Goecke, 2003). As Clancey puts it, his claim “is not 
merely a claim that context is important, but what constitutes the context, how you categorize the 
world, arises together with processes that are coordinating physical activity” (ibid. p. 95)15. The 
contribution by Clancey is also important since it provides us with a table in which all the most 
                                                          
15
 Clancey establishes a connection between SA and American Pragmatist (Dewey in particular). The importance of 
Dewey’s characterization of the notion of context for behavioral economics is emphasized by Khalil (2003). 
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important topics and issues debated between cognitivism and SA are juxtaposed for comparison. 
It is worthwhile to reproduce it below as a synthesis of the debate. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
 
4.6 Situated learning 
The 1993 issue of Cognitive Science on „Situated Activity‟ was not the only occasion in 
which Simon confronted with his SA counterparts. In 1996, together with his colleagues John 
Anderson and Lynne Reder, he wrote another article devoted to tackling and challenging SA 
(Anderson, Reder and Simon, 1996). The article focuses on a more specific theme, “the classical 
and well-known problem of transfer of learning” (Vera and Simon, 1993, p. 23), i.e. the problem 
of establishing whether learning is about apprehending abstract structures that can be transferred 
from one domain to another (e.g. from classrooms to the real-world situation) or whether it is 
always a situated activity, as SA argued. This contribution sparked another exchange with SA, 
this time with James Greeno alone, to which another reply followed (Greeno, 1997; Anderson, 
Reder and Simon, 1997). It not necessary to review the arguments and counter-arguments, which 
broadly replicate the 1993 debate in a more focused domain. What is important to notice is, 
however, that Simon never reconciled with SA in the last years of his scientific activity, the 
distance between them remaining „incommensurable‟.  
 
5. The aftermath: cognitivism and rationality in the post-Simonian era 
After reviewing this debate, the question arises of what has it to do with rationality 
studies. The answer is that it has much to do, and in many respects. First, the main thesis of this 
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essay is that the debate marked a watershed in the connection between rationality studies and 
cognitive psychology. To put the thesis in a nutshell, it was Simon, the father of bounded 
rationality who committedly and persuasively claimed that the privileged way in which bounded 
rationality should be conceived is in a cognitivist, technically non-situated and disembodied 
manner. This can be read as the authentic interpretation of bounded rationality. While the 
cognitivist content and framework of bounded rationality expressed in Human Problem Solving is 
patently clear, so that one might claim there is „nothing new under the sun‟, the episode of the 
debate reviewed here is historically meaningful because the future of cognitive was knocking 
there at the door, but a fruitful dialogue could not be established.   
An important claim of this essay is also that current rationality research expresses marked 
cognitivist residua. Looked with hindsight, such residua can be interpreted as a yet undisputed 
Simonian footprint on bounded rationality; whereas Simon‟s imprinting is lost in some other 
directions the cognitivist one could be substantially there. Cognitivist residua can be detected, 
first, in both the heuristic and biases approach and in the ecological rationality approach. While 
Simon‟s heritage has been contended by these conflicting views on the scissors argument (see 
Section 2 above), there seems to have been a substantial acceptance of the cognitivist core. 
Patokorpi (2008, p. 287) identifies the main source of Kahneman and Tversky‟s implicit residua 
of cognitivism in the idea that there is a benchmark course of action against which actual 
behavior can be compared. Furthermore, human biases, given Kaheneman and Tversky‟s 
adherence to Simon2, are just in the human mind, like bugs in a computer program
16
, without 
                                                          
16
 Heukelom (2014, p. 99) points out that Tversky stemmed from a ‘mathematical psychology’ tradition according 
to which the description of well-functioning human cognition was provided by Savage’s axioms. Modifying these 
axioms in the direction of making them consistent with systematic experimental violations, as the behavioral 
economics program tries to do (see below), can be read, metaphorically, as putting bugs into an otherwise reliable 
computer program (this is metaphorically true even if Savage’s tradition did not put particular emphasis on the 
phenomenon of ‘computations’, see Kao and Velupillai, 2015).  
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reference to the environment as object of interaction. In the end, programmatically neglecting the 
cognition/environment coupling, the heuristics and biases approach can be conceived as a non-
situated and disembodied approach by definition. Ecological rationality‟s acceptance of 
cognitivism is, however, more explicit and programmatic. In fact, the proponents of this view 
claim that a heuristic   
 
“specifies the precise steps of information gathering and processing that are involved in generating a decision, such 
that the heuristic can be instantiated as a computer program. For a fast and frugal heuristic, this means the 
computational model must specify principles for guiding a search for alternatives, information, or both, stopping that 
search, and making a decision”. (Gigerenzer et al., 1999, p. 16). 
 
Ecological rationality puts in the same effort that Simon put into the debate with SA, 
trying not to depict cognitivism as a „syntacticist‟ approach and claiming that computational 
processes of thought should not be content-blind (on the content-explicitness requirement of 
heuristics see, e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 1999, p. 29), but it continues to embody all the basic 
cognitivist ingredients, i.e. the simulation of human cognition as a symbolic and serial processing 
computer program. As ecological rationality scholars put it explicitly, “[we follow] Simon and 
Newell's emphasis on creating precise computational models” (Gigerenzer et al, 1999, p. 26)17. It 
would be unfair and misleading, however, to claim that these two contemporary programs of 
research on rationality are detached from current research in cognitive psychology in general. In 
fact, while ecological rationality is founded on the well-known and fertile program to explain 
behavior in evolutionary terms (see Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby, 1992), the heuristics and 
biases program has lately, i.e. after 2002 (see Kahneman, 2003, 2011), rooted its foundations in 
                                                          
17
 The ‘cognitivist’ version of Simon1 was stated by Simon, claiming  that “human rational behavior (and the rational 
behavior of all physical symbol systems) is shaped by a scissors whose two blades are the structure of task 
environments and the computational capabilities of the actor” (1990, p. 7, emphasis added).  
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the dual-system hypothesis of cognition (see Evans, 2008). Nonetheless, our claim here is that 
what rationality studies have borrowed from these research areas in cognitive psychology has 
been selected in order to be congruent with some basic ingredients of cognitivism
18
. 
If we shift our attention to the way in which bounded rationality has been conceived and 
implemented in economics, we must seriously take into consideration the story narrated by Sent 
(1997), concerning a different approach to AI as the foundation for the notion of bounded 
rationality, which is expressed by the economist Thomas Sargent in that crucial year 1993 
(Sargent, 1993). Against Simon‟s cognitivism (i.e. representationism and serial computing) 
Sargent opposes a „connectionist‟ approach, based on adaptive and parallel computing. This 
approach shares a common intellectual ground with the neurobiological approach of Clancey (see 
above). Nonetheless, as is common knowledge today in the SDE cognition milieu, 
„connectionism‟ is considered, with respect to the most relevant conceptual variables, simply a 
variant of cognitivism, i.e. a different kind of computer metaphor of the mind (see Calvo and 
Gomila, p. 4). While the connectionist approach to bounded rationality has, however, not resulted 
in any form of mainstream in economics, things are different if we look at the so-called New 
behavioral economics (Sent, 2004). The „New‟ attribute to the notion of behavioral economics is 
                                                          
18
 Fiori (2011) claims that the current dual-system theory foundations of the heuristics and biases program 
demonstrate a break with cognitivist foundations. This is, as we have tried to make clear, true but only half true. As 
Simon himself claimed (1990), dual-system theories of cognition and cognitivism were two complementary 
approach to the unitary ‘information processing’ view of human cognition. The more, dual-system theories of 
cognition, according to Simon, could have been reconciled with cognitivist assumptions (see, e.g., Vera and Simon, 
1993, p. 18; Simon, 1986). Earl (2012) makes clear that Simon himself was particularly interested in humans’ 
intuitive cognition (i.e. Kahneman’s ‘System 1’), thus emphasizing the Simonian roots of even Kahneman’s latest 
thought. In any case, neither of them has really ever managed, or even wanted, to set the question out of the 
‘information processing’ framework. This can still be seen in the hybrid  ‘dual-code’ theories of cognition.   
Regarding March’s and Nelson & Winter’s departures from bounded rationality (Fiori, 2011), they surely tackle two 
important ‘non-cognitivist’ topics, i.e. ill-structured problems and tacit knowledge, but they fail to establish a 
constitutive link with cognitive psychology. It is, however, true that organization studies have been more prone to 
overcoming Simon’s cognitivism than other fields. It is also remarkable that Simon had already tackled and refuted 
the issue of tacit knowledge claiming that ‘there is a kind of knowledge that cannot be explicitly expressed’ as being 
paradoxical (Simon, 1976b).   
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said to mark a distance of Kahneman and Tversky-inspired behavioral economics – i.e. Thaler-, 
Laibson-, Mullainathan-, Loewenstein-, and Camerer-like behavioral economics – from Simon‟s 
influence (see also Heukelom, 2014). What this essay wants to point out is that, irrespective of 
the many ways in which „New‟ behavioral economics differ from Simon‟s („Old‟) behavioral 
economics, the former has left unquestioned the issue of cognitivism of the latter. As Sent herself 
remarks,  
 
“[i]nspired by empirical and experimental counterevidence to the strong rationality assumptions employed in 
mainstream economics and by the rise of the metaphor of the brain as an information-processing device in cognitive 
psychology, they [New behavioral economists] formalize and test psychological predictions” (Sent, 2004, pp. 747-
748, emphasis added). 
 
„New‟ behavioral economists do so by maintaining the computer metaphor of the mind, 
and implementing it in the form of mathematical models of bounded rationality that progressively 
internalize more and more psychological evidence of human‟ departures from perfect 
rationality
19
. The connection between behavioral economics and cognitivism is for instance 
explicitly asserted by Angner and Loewenstein:  
 
“[t]hat representations are critical to cognitive science is evident […and] behavioral economists agree. […L]ike 
cognitive scientists, behavioral economists believe that it is appropriate to talk about entities such as beliefs, 
emotions and heuristics, which clearly are to be found at the level of representation. Much of what they study can be 
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 A contemporary program in behavioral economics that can be considered ‘hard’ cognitivist research, for 
instance, is the so-called Computable Behavioral Economics program, which emphasizes the computability 
requirements of behavioral economics models (Kao and Velupillai, 2015). Kao and Velupillai distinguish, in a slightly 
different way with respect to Sent (2004), an ‘Old’ from a ‘Modern’ behavioral economics: the former, properly 
Simonian, puts emphasis on the computational dimension of bounded rationality, while the latter is founded on 
subjective probability theory à la De Finetti-Savage.    
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understood in terms of representational structures in the mind and computational procedures on those structures“ 
(Angner and Loewenstein, 2012, p. 659, emphasis added). 
 
Further, there is a strand of experimental microeconomics that claims „behaviorist‟ (i.e. 
partially or not at all cognitive psychology-based) foundations (see Lewin, 1996). This thread of 
inquiry is mostly related to the work of Vernon L. Smith (e.g. 2007), finding its own identity 
demarcation through the label „experimental economics‟ (see Heukelom, 2011). Nonetheless, 
even regarding this behaviorist, non-psychologist, Robbins-Samuelson (Ross, 2005) approach to 
microeconomics a couple of remarks concerning some residuals of cognitivism have to be 
claimed. Loewenstein (1999), for instance, criticizes experimental economics for it does not pay 
attention to „contexts‟ in experiments, while should instead provide some. As we have seen, if 
even a „contextualized‟ experimental setting is considered by SA theorists as expression of the 
„third-person dogma‟ (i.e. the dogma according to which contexts are perceived by experimental 
subjects exactly in line with experimenters‟ intentions), programmatically contextless settings are 
thus the peak of non-situatedness
20
.   
 
6. Concluding remarks: a lost thread to pick up again? 
As Bruni and Sugden (2007) perceptively remark, the history of the relationship between 
economics and psychology is a history of „forks‟, that is, of choices that, once accomplished, 
bind a discipline until the next fork. This is also true for the relationship between economics and 
cognitive psychology. The thesis of this essay is that rationality studies in economics were in 
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 It is worth noting that Patokorpi (2008) identifies some, although heterogeneous, pieces of decision-making 
research that begin to internalize ‘situated’, ‘distributed’ and ‘embodied’ aspects. A deeply ‘situated’ research 
program in decision-making is, for instance, the ‘naturalistic decision-making’ research program, i.e. the study of 
real-world decisions (Klein, 2008). See also those works that begin to take the specific ‘embodied cognition’ point 
of view as a foundational perspective for rationality studies in economics (Spellman and Schnall, 2009; Oullier and 
Basso, 2010; Mastrogiorgio and Petracca, 2015). 
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1993 at a crucial fork for their own future: why bounded rationality at that stage did not depart 
with its „cognitivistist‟ interpretation? As we have seen, a contrast in which people could not 
really understand each other, typical of paradigm clashes, prevented rationality studies from 
developing along a route congruent with the actual trajectory of cognitive psychology.   
A few words, however,  should be spent on any „historical judgment‟ of Simon‟s position. 
To put the question bluntly: was Simon really an „obscurantist‟ in his rejection of situatedness as 
the foundation of a new paradigm in cognitive science and rationality studies? This seems to be 
the historical judgment conveyed through expressions such as „Simon‟s paradox‟ (Patokorpi, 
2008) or, worse, „Simon‟s error‟ (Secchi, 2010). This harsh judgment cannot, however, be 
shared. This is for two fundamental reasons. First, in 1993 SA, as part of the greater SDE 
paradigm, was just a new thread of research that, although in great expansion, was not, as we 
have seen, an established nor even coherent corpus of research. Under these conditions, it would 
have been difficult even to state which version of SA should take over the cognitivist version of 
bounded rationality. In this respect, adhering to the most radical version of SA could also have 
meant viewing situations as idiosyncratic events that cannot be systematically studied. Such a 
stance has a post-modernist flavor that characterized the intellectual milieu of the early 1990s, 
and that is likely to have exerted an influence on the most radical version of SA. Simon‟s 
opposition to this interpretation of SA is, with hindsight, understandable. This issue connects 
with another important consideration according to which Simon‟s point of view cannot simply be 
described as an „error‟. Simon‟s interest in the human cognitive faculty of „abstraction‟ (in the 
current cognitive psychology jargon, the human faculty to go „off-line‟), which was substantially 
underplayed by the original SA theorists, has today regained centrality in the current „embodied‟ 
point of view on cognition. In fact, according to the influential embodied cognitive psychologist 
Margaret Wilson, 
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“a productive science of embodied cognition, if it takes seriously the claim that much or all of human cognition has 
its roots in embodiment, must consider how embodied cognition can go “off-line” - decouple from situation-bound 
reactivity and use body-based resources for other purposes” (Wilson, 2008, p. 380, emphasis added). 
 
It remains to be seen whether bounded rationality research should be updated today in the 
light of the new advances in cognitive psychology. Our answer to this question is 
straightforward: if the foundations of economic rationality are in cognitive psychology, as Simon 
firmly believed, this update should be accomplished. In this regard, as we have remarked, the 
updating should point toward the embodied cognition approach, which has properly softened 
what may have been idiosyncratic in the original formulations of SA. Picking up the embodied 
thread in rationality studies again today means, however, “distinguish[ing] the conception of 
reason as embodied and embedded from the important but still insufficiently radical notion of 
„bounded rationality‟”, as the cognitive psychologist Andy Clark claims (Clark 1997, p. 243, n.4 , 
emphasis added). The reconciliation between bounded rationality and the SDE cognition 
paradigm is something that remains to be accomplished in current economic psychology and 
rationality research.  
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Table 1 
Theoretical Differences Between Symbolic Approach and Situated Cognition 
 Symbolic Approach Situated Cognition 
memory stored rules or schema structures in a 
representation language 
neural nets reactivated and 
recomposed in-line via selection; not 
a place or body of descriptions of 
how the world or agent‟s behavior 
appears 
representation meaningful forms internally 
manipulated subconsciouly 
created and interpreted in our activity 
(first person);  external 
representations ≠ representing to self  
≠ neural structures 
internal processes modularly independent; can perceive 
and reason without acting 
codetermined, dialectic; always 
adapted (generalized from past 
coordinations), inherently 
chronological 
immediate behavior selected from prepared possibilities 
("preexisting actions") 
adapted, composed, coordinated, 
always new; always a sensorimotor 
circuit 
reasoning supplants immediate behavior: goes 
on subconsciously 
occurs in sequences of behavior over 
time 
speaking meaning of the utterance is 
represented before speaking occurs 
speaking and conceiving occur 
dialectically; representing meaning 
occurs as later commentary behavior 
learning  secondary effect (chunking) primary learning is always occurring 
with every thought, perception, and 
action; chunking occurs as 
categorization of sequences; 
secondary (reflective) learning occurs 
in sequences of behavior over time; 
requires perception. 
knowledge representation corresponds to physical structures 
stored in human's brain 
a model of some system in the world 
and operators for manipulating the 
model; abstracts agent's behavior, 
explaining interaction in some 
environment over time. 
concepts labeled structures, corresponding to 
linguistic terms, with associated 
description of properties and relations 
to other concepts, i.e., meanings are 
symbolically represented and stored 
prelinguistic categorizations of 
perceptual categorizations; ways of 
coordinating perception and action; 
has no inherent formal structure; 
cannot be inventoried; meaning and 
perception are inseparable. 
analogy feature mapping of concept 
representations 
process of perceiving and acting by 
recomposing previous coordinations 
(e.g., "seeing as"). 
From Clancey, 1993, p. 111 
